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IN THE 
~ Supreme Court 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
.JA~IES D. LAWS, l 
Plaintiff, INDUST~~AL CO~fMISSION OF I 
UTAH, and GENEVA STEEL COM-
PAXY, a corporation, j 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7253 
In addition to the facts contained in the statement in 
plaintiff's brief, we wish to direct the court's aHention 
to the following faets which we believe will aid the court 
in the determination of this contro~ersy. 
Plaintiff was first employed at Geneva on July 26, 
1946, the very day of his injury. Compensation was :paid 
for one week and wages paid for August 5, 6, 7, 12 and 13, 
1946; on August 14, 1946 he was, on his request, further 
hospitalized and on September 3, 1946, again on his re-
quest, re'leased. ( R. 125) After an examination by the 
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).fedical Staff of Geneva he was hospitalized in October, 
1946 and the operation performed by Dr. Lindem. Re-
lease followed on November 8, 1946, in turn followed by 
further hospitalization and release on December 22, 1946. 
Geneva paid for all such medical care and hospitalization 
and compensation up to that time. (R. 92) 
On May 23, 194 7 the Medical Advisory Board made 
its recommendalfions (R. 32): 
In estimating this disability we take into 
account that this :possibly may have existed prior 
to his injury, but believe that he did have some 
injury, and also feel that there are certain path-
ologic changes in the spine, and also there is the. 
appearance of a psychoneurosis of long standing. 
His disability is mainly subjective. We would 
estimate the permanent partial disability at not 
over 15% loss of bodily function.'' 
And on June 2, 1947, the Commission notified plain-
tiff and Geneva (R. 33) : 
''After carefully considering the recommen-
dations of the ].fedical Advisory Board, and all 
matters pertaining to your case, it has been de-
termined that you have suffered a permanent dis-
ability amounting to 15% loss of bodily function." 
Such was the award made on December 24, 1947, 
after full hearing before the Commission. 
Without consulting the Commission or Geneva p1ain-
tiff on January 19, 1948 underwent a further and dif-
ferent operation, a spinal fusion "to correct the defect 
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Plaintiff in1med.iately filed his first petition for re-
hearing he fore the Con1mission, alleging: 
··The hosuital reeord.s and. rnedical diseoYer-
ies n1ade dnri~g the t)peration (of Jnn. 1D, 1~)-±8) 
\Yill prove to the comn1ission conclusively that 
. the applicant suffered a more seriou~ injur)· than 
was the opinion of the Drs. testifying at the hear-
ing and that the applicant has not been adequate-
ly-compensated for his injuries." (Tr. :16-7.) 
. . . f h . t d .Tj\'{ri;; 29 Tlns pehhon or re eanng was gran e on , 
· 1948. On the rehearing it was stipulated that the ·testi-
mony and evidence submitted in the hearings of October 
22, 1947 and December 9, 1947 would be accepted on the 
rehearing. (R. 169.) 
After hearing, the Commission on July 12, 1948 made 
its decision : 
''The question is whether the applicant was 
fully compensated by the defendants for the in-
jury received on July 26, 1946. '' 
and made the following Findings: 
''After hearing the testimony in the case and 
reviewing the same as set forth in the transcript 
and other documentary evidence received and 
made a part of the record, the Commission finds 
that there has been no change in the physical con-
dition of the applicant since the award made on 
December 24, 1947 and therefore conclude that the 
award made to the applicant on December 24, 1947 
was considered adequate to cover the temporary 
total disability suffered by the applicant as a re-
sult of his injuries received on July 26, 1946 as 
weU as the permanent partial disability which 
the applicant had on December 24, 1947 as a re-
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sult of such injuries. 
''The Commission further concludes that the 
applicant has been adequately compensated for 
his injuries received on July 26, 1946. '' 
We do not admit, of course, the statements made in 
the brief to the effect that the Plaintiff in fact totally 
disabled; nor do we admit that the wndisputed evidence 
was to that effect. 
I. 
The refusal of the Industria'! Commission to render 
a decision on the rehearing modifying its previous de-
cision of December 24, 1947 on the grounds that the ap-
plicant had shown no change in his physical condition 
since the date of the original decision of December 24, 
1947 was contra to law and was error. 
In this statement of error it is apparent that plain-
tiff misconceives the import and intent of the decision of 
July 12, 1948. On the rehearing held June 9, 1948 the 
entire record made on the previous hearings was ac.: 
cepted as part of the record. The Commission did not 
confine itself to the evidence received on the rehearing, 
but as stated by H, considered all the evidence, includ-
ing all three hearings. Counsel frankly concedes that 
applicant failed to show any change in his physica'l con-
dition-couns·el had no alternative-applicant and his 
own witness testified that there had been no change. 
The Commission in fact, as it was bound to do, con-
sidered the matter entirely open-a trial de novo-and 
upon all the evidence made its decision. Upon granting 
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• • "' -= -= 1nay adopt the prior findings made, if 
in its judginent they snfficientl~· reflect all of the 
1naterial fact~ a~ disclosed h~· the evidence, and 
n1ake a new order or render a new judgment ac-
cordingly, "·hether it be the same or different .ef-
fect than was the first or displaced order or judg-
Inent. '' 
Carter v. Industrial Co1nn1ission, 76 U. 520, 
290 P. 776. 
The decision of July 12, 1948 quoted above was mere-
ly an adoption of the findings of the previous award. 
The Commission again reviewed all the ,evidence and 
the award of December 24, 1947, which was adequate 
when made, was still adequate and reaffirmed. The evi-
dence presented at the rehearing revealed nothing new 
to the Commission of substance. That later evidence 
was merely cumu'lative and, in the proper exercise of 
its fact-finding power, the Commission could see no 
reason for making different findings. The plaintiff pre-
sented nothing to persuade the Commission that the facts 
were anything other than originally found. Plaintiff's 
argument should be addressed to the Commission, not 
to this court. His further evidence did not tip the hal-
anee of the weight of the evidence in his favor. 
"\Ve call the court's attention to ~the last paragraph of 
the award: 
''The Commission further concludes that the 
applicant has been adequately compensated for 
his injuries received on July 26, 1946." (Italics 
ours.) 
It may be conceded that when a rehearing is granted 
the Commission may correct any errors it may have 
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committed in the original decision. But that is not to 
say that it must render a different decision. The plain-
tif was given an opportunity to persuade the Commis-
sion that the first award was inadequate, but he failed to 
do so. On disputed testimony the Commission was of the 
same opinion still. Dr. Okelberry testified on the first 
hearing (October 22, 1947) that a spinal fusion was in 
his opinion necessary. (R. 97) The Commission did not 
agree. Such operation was performed January 19, 1948 
and on June 9, 1948 the same doctor testified that p~ain­
tiff would not have gotten well without the operation. 
( R. 178) The Commission again did not agree. 
We do not understand that plaintiff claims there is 
any lack of evidence to support the findings of the Com-
mission. He has brought this case here contending that 
the award must be set aside because based on an er-
roneous ground. But that is not sufficient even were it 
true; he must show that the decision itself is erroneous. 
The reasons or grounds given for its decision are no 
essential part of the decision: . 
* * * and it is universally recogniz·ed that a 
correct decision will not be disturbed even though 
it is based on improper grounds. 3 Am. Jur. p. 
367, § 825; Buringham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 24'5 
Pac. 977. 
Where the finding of the Commission is cor-
rect, error in its reason, if any, will not prevent 
affirmanee of the award. 71 C.J., p. 127:5, § 1251. 
II. 
Errors Numbers Two, Three and Four as sta·ted by 
plain tiff on page 7 of this brief are : 
6 
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Error Number Two 
The C01nmission conunitted error in not 
awarding the applicant further compensation 
fro1n the 26th day of December 1946 to the date 
of the rehearing. 
Error Number Three 
The Connnission committed error in not 
awarding the appellant the medical and hospital 
expenses incurred incidental to the operation of 
January 19, 1947 (1948~) 
Error Number Four 
The Commission committed error in not con-
tinuing the payn1ent of compensation to the ap-
pellant from the date of rehearing until such time 
as the Commission should determine in fur~ther 
proceedings the exact date the appellant's condi-
tion became fixed and at that time awarding to 
the appellant such compensation for his partial 
permanent loss of bodily function as he was then 
entitled. · 
Plaintiff's (applicant-appellant) position is: 
1. That he should be awarded compensation as for 
temporary total disability up to the time of the rehear-
ing (Error Number Two); and from the date of the re-
hearing ''until such time as the Commission should de-
termine in further proceedings the exact date the ape~­
lant's condition became fixed (Error Number Four). 
2. That upon his condition becoming fixed an award 
as for permanent partial disability should be made. (Er-
ror Number Four.) 
3. That he should be awarded medical and hospital 
-. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
expenses incidental to the operation of January 19, 1948. 
(Error Number Three.) 
Since plaintiff's entire argument is based upon the 
false premise that he was in fact totally disabled at the 
time of the rehearing, we thought it proper to discuss 
these propositions together. 
1. The Commission in making its decision of July 
12, 1948 did not limit its consideration to the "·evidence 
presented on the rehearing.'' That order itself recites 
''After hearing the testimony in the case and reviewing 
the same as set forth in the transcript and other docu-
mentary evidence received and made a part of the rec-
ord, the Commission finds * * *.'' This is an express 
sta:tement that the Commission considered all the evi-
dence, not mere'ly that offered on the rehearing. This 
court will of course take that statement at its face .value. 
Furthermore, plaintiff expressly stipulated (Tr. 169): 
Com. Egan: :May it be stipulated that the 
testimony· and evidence submitted in those (prior) 
hearings may he accepted in this hearing' 
).fr. Gibson: It may. 
:Mr. H-eald: Yes. 
2. The Commission in its previous award found 
that plaintiff ''suffered certain disabilities and there-
fore concludes that he is entitled to the benefits under 
the Compensation Act, i.e., payment for temporary total 
disability from the 26th day of July 1946 to the 22nd 
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un the basis of 15% loss of bodily function and the award 
was n1ade accordingly. Such award was made upon con-
flicting evidence; is supported by substantia'! eompetent 
evidence and would not be disturbed by this court. The 
award of July 1:2, 19-!8 based on all the evidence con-
cluded that the award of December 24, 1947 afforded 
plaintiff adequate compensation for temporary total dis-
ability (as well as for permanent partial) and thereby 
adopted the findings and conclusions of the earlier 
award. It rnay not be successfully contended that the 
Commission was bound to reach a different conclusion 
-the aet of the Commission in granting a rehearing did 
not guarantee a greater award than that already made. 
The Commission granted a rehearing to afford p1ain-
tiff an opportunity to present further evidence in an 
attempt to persuade the Commission that it was in error. 
The plaintiff did not sustain the burden and the Com-
mission was of the same opinion still. 
Carter v. Industrial Commission, supra, 76 
Utah 520, 290 Pac. 776. 
3. The award as made on December 24, 1947 and 
as reaffirmed July 12, 1948 was bas·ed on substantial, 
competent although disputed, evidence and should not 
be disturbed by this court. 
"It appears to be the contention of the 
plaintiff. that this court will review the record to 
determine wherein lies the preponderance of the 
evidence and affirm or set aside the denial of 
award or judgment of the Commission accord-
ingly. But this we are not ca1led upon, nor are 
we a~t liberty to do. * * * We are called on, in 
this case, Inerely to determine whether there is 
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anv substantial evidence to support that decision. 
vVilson v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 524, 
108 Pac. (2) 519. 
In the ordinary case it is not incumbent upon de-
fendant to show the evidence that supports the award 
made by the Commission; but rather the plaintiff must 
show wher,ein the evidence does not support the award as 
made. However, since plaintiff in the case a;t bar states 
n1any times that the uncontradicted evidence is that 
plaintiff was in fact totally disabled, we ask the court's 
indulgence while we refer to some of ~the evidence which 
counsel would have this court and the Commission ig-
nore. 
A. As to temporary tota1 disability-(the injury 
to the coccyx had been taken care of prior to the first 
hearing. R. 97) 
Dr. Hatch, R. 117: 
* * * * 
Q. Did you find in this man any injury to the 
disc between the vertebra~ 
A. I didn',t find any that I could make out. 
I told him if I had a back like this and had 
infection in the throat and tonsils and prostate 
and sinuses that I would have them taken care of, 
and that he would be much better. 
Dr. Lindem (R. 125-6) 
A. After preliminary examination which oc-
curred over a period of days, and taking a blood 
count and urinalysis, b1ood pressure and tempera-
tures. I myself reached the conclusion that it was 
a controversial matter as to whether Mr. Laws 
10 
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had a fractured roeeyx. The presence of tlw spon-
dylolisthesi~ and also the osteoarthriti~ and the 
presenee of p~·orrhea was noted. It. was no't in 
a great degree and probably because of recom-
E1endations, whieh were not entirely in agreement 
a.n10ng- the orthopedic Inen, Dr. Pemberton and 
Huether. It wa~ discussed with Dr. Wright and 
the hospital staff. 'y e concluded that inasmuch 
a~ :JJ r. Laws emnplained of pain in his coccyx at 
the time. It had been demonstrated in our find-
ings that the emnplaints "'ere entirely inconsis-
tent. but they finally seen1ed to concentrate on 
the coccyx region. I did not agree that this had 
been fractured. However, Dr. Okelberry said 
it was fractured and Dr. Huether though it n1ight 
be fractured. I proceeded to operate the coccyx. 
He was making complaint out of proportion to a 
fractured cocc~'X. However, we removed it and 
he made recovery. I sent him to a Masseur, and 
31r. Laws would not permit the masseur to do 
any massaging. The masseur complained that he 
would not let him proceed with the massage and 
ph~'siotherapy that we recommended, so we 
stopped that manner of treatment. Then when 
he had him up and around he began to complain 
in different regions of the body. We found he 
was lying in bed in the morning until the doctor 
made the rounds, and then he would be n1ost 
agile. After a period extending to the 8th of 
October, a period of nearly a month, we felt that 
with the observation and examination that we had 
carried on with ~Ir. Laws, that he was physically 
able as he was at the time of his pre-employment 
physical examination, and that he shou1d be re-
quired to go back to work, and we so recommended 
and discharg·ed him from the hospital. In my 
absence from the city at the time Mr. Laws quit 
work last December and came to m~v office, my 
associate, not knowing what to do, sent him to the 
11 
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hospital again. V1 e came to the same con~lu­
sion, that whatever disability he had a_t the time 
of the injury we had relieved and no resi?-ual from 
those injuries, and had put him back In a state 
that was comparable to his pre-employment ex-
amination. We felt he had no residual. We em-
ployed orthopedic men and had the Hosp~tal Staff 
and my own associates at the office and on recom-
mendation of the Industrial Commission he was 
brought up for a J\![edical Board hearing. We had 
Dr. Wright perform a comp1ete neurological ex-
amination, which was done, and his report is in 
the record. I have not examined :1\tir. Laws since. 
I-Ie was discharged from St. Mark's Hospital in 
December. Except for observation in the room, I 
don't know anything about him. 
The Medical Advisory Board's ~ecommendations of 
May 23, 1947 (R. 32) : 
''In estimating this disability we take into 
account that this possibly may have existed prior 
to his injury but believe that he did have some 
injury, and also feel that there are certain path-
ologic changes in the spine and also there is the 
appearance of a psychoneurosis of long standing. 
His disability is mainly subjective. We would 
estimate the permanent partial disability at not 
over 15% loss of hodi~y function.'' 
And Dr. Stewart A. Wright, who, at the request of 
the Commission examined plaintiff March 27, 1947, (Tr. 
R. 2'6-8): 
"It s·eems to me that this patient greatly 
exaggerates and even invents complaints and I 
do not ·believe there is any indication for surgery 
at this time. I would suggest that a settlem·ent 
be worked out if possible, at a disability not to 
.exceed 5% would be reasonable.'' 
12 
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Plaintiff seen1s to be of the opinion that only tlwt eYi-
dence offered at the rehearing is to be considered. 
B. As to permanent partial-the evidence recited 
above ah~o supports the Cmnmission 's finding that an 
award based on a 15~~ loss of bodily function was ade-
quate compensation. Such award was not only supported 
by substantial evidence, but gave the plaintiff the ab-
solute maxi1num. 
C. ~-\.s to medical and hospital expenses : 
At the original hearing Dr. Okelberry stated it as 
his opinion that the spinal fusion operation was neces-
sary. He performed that operation and after doing so 
was of the opinion that it had been necessary. Dr. Lin-
denl and Dr. Wright disagreed and the Commission, ac-
cepting what to it was the more credib~·e testimony, found 
that such operation was not necessary. It is not enough 
for plaintiff to show that the operation was necessary 
to cure a congenital defect; he must show that it was 
made necessary by the accidental injury. And therein 
plaintiff has failed. 
Plaintiff concedes that the operation of January 19, 
1948 was performed without the consent, written or oral, 
of the Commission. The l\Iedical and Surgical Fee 
Schedule issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
effective September 1, 194 7, provides in part: 
11. Necessary Attention. 
No patient will be permitted to change from 
one hospital to another, or from one doctor to an-
other without first fully explaining in writing his 
13 
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reasons for desiring such change and securing the 
written consent of the Commission. When un-
authorized charges are made the patient must pay 
for such change. 
When, on January 19, 1948 the spinal fusion was per-
formed, the order or award of December 24, 1947, while 
not yet a final award (in the sense that time for review 
had elapsed), had not been vacated or set aside. It was 
a valid order until vacated or set aside. That award was 
a finding that the spina1 fusion was wot necessary; yet 
plaintiff changed from Dr. Lindem to Dr. Okelberry, 
from St. Mark's Hospital to the L.D.S. Hospital; all 
without any cons·ent of the Commission, and this in face 
of the Commission's view that the operation was not 
necessary. After the operation was performed the Com-
mission reaffirmed its position. The findings being such, 
and no consent having been obtained, we may well ask 
on what theory can Geneva he required to pay for the 
operation~ Section 42-1-75 does not require an employer 
to pay for such medical and hospital services as the 
patient may desire or even what he feels to be neces-
sary, hut only such ''as may be necessary.'' 
IV 
If it be said that the award of the Commission does 
not contain sufficient or proper findings to sustain the 
award, we refer the court to the following rules which 
are well esta!b~ished in this jurisdiction: 
l. The Commission is not required to make any 
written findings. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. 
14-
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Industrial Com1nission, 66 Utah -!-!H, 2-!:~ Pac. 
800. 
·) If no findings are 1nade this Court ean supply 
the1n aU. 
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 
103 Utah 381, 137 P. (2) 364. 
3. In the absence of findings this court will pre-
sume that had they been 1nade ,they would 
have been such as to support the decision; it 
cannot be assumed the Commission would have 
entered a decision contrary to what they be-
lieve the facts to justify. 
:Jioray v. Ind. Com., 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 
1023: Jones Y. Ind. Com., 90 Utah 121, 61 P. 
2d 10; American Smelting & Refining Co v. 
Ind. Con1., 79 Utah 302, 10 P. 2d 918. 
The record herein will sustain findings to the effect 
that: 
(1) Temporary total disability extended from July 
26, 1946 to December 22, 1946. 
(2) Temporary total disability ended·December 22, 
1946. 
(3) Physical condition became fixed December 22, 
1946. 
( 4) Permanent partial disability suffered was a 
15% loss of bodily function. 
( 5) No surgery or medical or hospital services 
were necessary after December 22, 1946 and the opera-
tion performed January 19, 1948 by Dr. Okelberry was 
not authorized by the Commission and was not necessary 
15 
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to treat the patient for any condition caused by the in-
jury of July 26, 1946 or for any aggravation of a pre-
existing condition due to the said injury. 
Which findings we must assume the Commission 
wou'ld have made had it made findings. It's award was 
based upon the assumption that such were the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
In its award of July 12, 1948 made after the rehear-
ing the Commission adopted and reaffirmed the pre-
vious award of December 24, 1947. The award, being 
based upon substantial, competent evidence, should not 
be upset by this court. 
Respectfully su'bmitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
Assist,ant Attorney General 
For the Indus't!r~al Commissio:n 
C. C. PARSON'S. 
WM. M. 1\fcCREA 
A.D. MOFFAT 
CALVIN A. BEHLE 
Attorneys for 
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